Although never rigorously tested, it has become a sort of accepted wisdom amongst social scientists that government decentralization offers key advantages for innovators. Decentralized governments are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation's gale of creative destruction. Meanwhile, centralized states, even when democratic, have come to be viewed as rigid and thus hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new technology; or are subject to capture by status-quo interest groups which use their influence to promote policies which ultimately restrict technological change. Therefore decentralized government is often perceived as a necessary institutional foundation for encouraging long-run technological innovation. In the following article, this wisdom is tested using data on international patent activity, scientific publications, and hightechnology exports. The results suggest that the supposed technological advantages of decentralized states are a fiction, and that international pressures may be more important.
Introduction

Research Summary
Why are some countries more technologically innovative than others? Technological innovation is a vital component of every state's long-run economic growth, international comparative advantage, and relative military power. In recognition of this, almost every society expends a considerable share of its resources on the pursuit of technological advance. However, despite the random nature of innovation, and the seemingly clear requirements for promoting innovative behavior, some countries are consistently more successful than others at technological progress, even amongst the industrialized democracies.
When observed over the long-run, one apparent trend is the ability of decentralized states to maintain their places at the technological frontier. Decentralized governments are widely seen as agile, competitive, and well structured to adapt to innovation's gale of creative destruction.
Meanwhile centralized states, even when democratic, seem either unable to achieve high rates of innovation or to maintain technological leadership if achieved. Over time this observation has evolved into conventional wisdom: centralized organizations of all sizes, from firms to nationstates, have come to be viewed as rigid and thus either hostile to the risks, costs, and change associated with new technology, or prone to cling too long to fool-hearty or outdated technological projects. 1 These sentiments can be found both in the popular press 2 and throughout the academic literature. In the latter, a number of prominent economists and political scientists have applied various forms of the political decentralization hypothesis to explain differences in national innovation rates. These efforts include works by Nathan Rosenberg & L.E. Birdzell Jr., Joel Mokyr, Daron Acemoglu, and Daniel Drezner; or can be inferred from the writings of scholars in evolutionary economics such as Richard Nelson, Sydney Winter, and Walter Vincenti (citations below).
about government structure and technological change demand that I be more flexible in my definition, and allow decentralization to be either vertical or horizontal. In vertically decentralized states, authority has been shifted away from the central government and towards local governments, the classic example being federalism. 7 In horizontally decentralized states, authority is shared between an executive, legislature, judiciary, and in some cases even a powerful bureaucracy or autonomous military. 8 In practice, many states decentralize even further, with power formally divided between different houses of the legislature, competing bureaucracies, or branches of the armed forces. Finally, as will be further discussed below, when measuring the degree of decentralization it is also important to consider that government structure can have both formal de jure components (those expressed in law or constitution) and informal de facto components (e.g. the extent of party alignment across different branches of government, or the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch).
Theory
Decentralization proponents emphasize four primary mechanisms by which government structure should affect national innovation rates. First, they argue that both horizontal and vertical decentralization increase the number of political and economic units participating in, funding, and demanding innovative activities. This not only multiplies technological search and experimentation efforts, 9 but can also increase the diversity of these research efforts and the scientific-technical knowledge acquired through them. 10 Second, scholars assert that, by increasing the number of units, decentralization increases competition, thus increasing the incentives for innovation. This theme recurs throughout much of the innovation literature, but is perhaps best specified in the federalism literature. Federalism scholars points out that decentralization can result in a "Delaware effect" in which sub-national governments compete with one another to attract business investment, and therefore constantly improve the legal, tax, and regulatory environments for innovators. 11 This concept has evolved into Weingast's "market-preserving federalism", in which federalism can prevent government from acting in a predatory manner towards innovators, and allow credible commitments to produce promarket policies and public goods. 12 Third, it is also argued that decentralization provides superior information for both policymakers and innovators. 13 Hayek observed that much information which is helpful for economic activity cannot be usefully centralized (e.g. tacit knowledge). 14 Although Hayek wrote about the merits of decentralized markets over central economic planning, the implications for political decentralization are clear: local policymakers simply have superior information about local conditions than do distant national legislators or bureaucrats, and can therefore design better policy for the local environment. And better policy should mean more efficient allocation of resources towards, and proper incentives for, local innovators. This does not mean that centralized political coordination of any kind is always bad for technological innovation; but as Tiebout has shown, decentralized local public goods production is generally better at reflecting popular preferences than is centralized national public goods production. 15 Hence in Tiebout's economy, different subnational governments provide a menu of different policy environments, which allows different kinds of "consumer-voters" of public goods (here innovators consuming scientific knowledge, In sum, however, despite all the conditions put forward by different theorists, and regardless of the specific mechanism emphasized, the core of the decentralization argument remains. Or as Mokyr puts it, after a thorough discussion of caveats and provisos:
All the same, some measure of decentralization is probably desirable...it seems that too much coordination can be unhealthy. The need to retain some political diversity, coupled with openness and freedom of both ideas and the people in which they are embedded, seems to be undiminished even as knowledge itself has become more mobile... 
Scant Empirical Evidence
The causal mechanisms outlined above dovetail with some widely held stereotypes about national differences in innovation rates. However, little empirical data has yet been produced to verify the assumption that decentralized states have some sort of comparative institutional advantage that promotes technological innovation. And the empirical data which does exist is either limited to anecdotal evidence and stylized facts, or does not directly bear on the question of innovation rates. Therefore it is unclear whether any government structure-innovation relationship exists in the first place, either in the aggregate or over the long-run.
In fact, few scholars have attempted to build an empirical case for the decentralizationinnovation hypothesis. In separate research programs, Colleen Dunlavvy, Peter Hall, and T.J. 33 This empirical section of this paper will suggest that the political decentralization hypothesis flunks such a "hoop" test. [*** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***] Ideally, one would want to perform a natural experiment, in which observed changes in government structure can be followed by observations of changes in innovative activity, with all other factors held constant. While no empirical situation fits this ideal, we do have a number of cases in which governments have decentralized over time, and where we can also collect some quantitative data on innovative outputs. These are reported in Figure 2 (below). This graph plots changes in decentralization versus changes in innovation in the twenty-nine countries which underwent the largest changes in government decentralization from 1975-95. In addition, I also plotted the results for the twenty-five countries with the largest changes in relative innovation rates. 34 As my measure of overall decentralization in this graph, I employ the POLCON Index developed by Witold Henisz (U. Penn). 35 The POLCON Index is a 0-1 measure which takes into account the number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy, modified by the extent of party alignment across branches of government and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. The inclusion of party alignment and legislative preferences means that POLCON is not a pure measure of structural decentralization. However, unlike measures which rely purely on formal institutional structure, the POLCON measure allows me to control for states which may be formally decentralized but which may suffer ineffective de facto checks and balances. It also provides a finer gauge than the traditional technique of using "dummies". Moreover, the POLCON index has been shown to be statistically and positively significant in affecting both business investment decisions and technological diffusion in various countries, therefore it is natural to ask whether it holds similar significance for innovation rates. 36 For my measure of innovation in Figure 2 , I look at changes in relative innovation rates.
Simple Bivariate Tests
Specifically, my measure is a country's change in patent citations received (per capita) as a share of the world average, based on international patent data from the United States Patent & Trademark
Office (USPTO). 37 This second database of patents adds value in two ways. First, it provides a separate and independent set of patent data by which to index innovation. 38 Second, forward citations data are available for all USPTO patents granted between 1975-99. Simple patent counts only measure how much innovation is being produced, but weighting patents by their forward citations allow us to control somewhat for the quality, as well as the quantity, of the innovations being patented. The use of citations-weighted patents as a measure of innovation is discussed at greater length in the next section.
If decentralization is as overwhelming an influence on innovation as is assumed in the literature, then those states which have decentralized the most should enjoy significant improvements in innovation rates. However, as Figure 2 reveals, only Taiwan and South Korea appear to have experienced significant increases in both variables. Otherwise, the countries that decentralized most (Spain, Ecuador, Portugal, Greece, and Thailand), experienced little change in innovation rates; while the countries which had major shifts in innovative performance (Japan, Israel, Switzerland, US, Finland) underwent little change in government structure. Of course, "decentralization" in many of these countries was more horizontal and informal, and is perhaps better described as a move from autocracy or single-party government towards genuine multi-party democracy. But this only strengthens the claim being made here: even using the broadest definition and least formal measure of decentralization, it is difficult to find a correlation with innovation.
[*** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***] Using the same measure of innovation, Figure 3 selects out those countries with the largest increases in relative innovation rates from 1975-95. The first thing that should strike us here is how little change in relative innovation rates there is at all. Few of the 74 countries sampled registered any significant shift in their relative rankings, and those with less than a 7.5 percent change have been left off of the graph altogether. Secondly, even a cursory examination reveals that the decentralized states appear to have had little innovative advantage over other states, regardless of size or wealth. The decentralized US and Canada both experienced large relative gains in forward patent cites per capita; meanwhile the federalist states of Germany and Switzerland suffered significant relative declines. Amongst the biggest gainers are countries like Japan, Taiwan, Israel, Singapore and South Korea, all relatively centralized states. One major new innovator, Finland, even marginally increased its centralization (as measured by POLCON). But before we credit centralization with this achievement, we must also note that three of the most centralized European states (France, Great Britain, and Sweden) are amongst the largest decliners in relative innovation rates. More interesting is the nation that does not appear in Figure 3 , Spain, which significantly decentralized by almost any measure one can calculate. Spain's negative change in relative innovative performance (a mere -0.01 percent) is too small to register on this graph, despite the fact that its government continuously decentralized, both horizontally and vertically, formally and informally, throughout the entire time period sampled. Hence, even if I "cheat" by selecting on the dependent variable, I cannot substantiate the strongest version of the decentralization hypothesis.
[*** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ***] Of course, these simple bivariate tests do not allow us to control for additional control variables invoked by weaker versions of the decentralization hypothesis. According to Drezner, Mokyr, and others, these conditional variables should include such factors as democracy, overall economic resources, base level of technical development, factor endowments, military spending, and openness to trade. These control variables will be considered in greater detail in the regressions below.
Multivariate Statistical Tests
Methods & Data
In order to test weaker versions of the decentralization-innovation hypothesis, I turn in this section to multivariate regressions. I conduct cross-sectional statistical analysis of innovation rates across some 70 countries during the 1975-95 period. 39 Although time-series cross-sectional regressions would be ideal here, the presence of rarely changing independent variables over time creates multicollinearity issues, especially when used with country fixed effects. Therefore I stick with ordinary least squares (OLS), with Huber-White estimates of the standard errors. But since there are significant changes in some of the independent variables during these two decades, I later split the dataset into four consecutive five-year sub-periods and test each separately. And since a lag likely occurs between the activity of innovation and the patent application, I lag the independent variables 1, 5, and 10 years in separate regressions wherever possible. is based on R&D intensity, and has been used widely by academic researchers and major government institutions for almost two decades. 47 Its sectors include aircraft, spacecraft, pharmaceuticals, office machinery (includes accounting and computing), telecommunications equipment (including radio and television), and medical & scientific instruments. 
Additional Control Variables
In order to test the weaker versions of the decentralization hypothesis, we also need to include controls for those variables specified by decentralization theorists as conditioning the effects of government decentralization on innovation. For example, almost universally, these researchers assume that the size of a country's economy and its level of development affect innovation rates. The idea here is that larger economies will have more resources upon which innovators can draw, and that innovators in more advanced economies should be able to draw on these resources more effectively. Hence the primary additional control variables I focus on are found in the World Bank's World Development Indicators database: GDP (to control for the amount of economic resources upon which innovators can draw), and per capita electric power consumption (to control for base-level of economic development). 54 Also, since most decentralization scholars, especially Mokyr, require a certain amount of political freedom for where patenting activity in period t =0 through t=1 is a function of the independent variables at time t =0. The model is identical when publications are used as the measure of innovation. However, when high-technology exports per GDP is the dependent variable, the control for economic resources (log of GDP) is replaced with a control for total population (log of population). This allows me to match the per capita patents and publications regressions as closely as possible.
This model will doubtless arouse some criticism for its narrow approach. Economists, sociologists, and policy-analysts often take a more encompassing view when performing statistical analysis of innovation at the national level, and include a myriad of policy variables, financial controls, and education measures alongside the primary independent variables of interest. Given the large potential number of causal lines feeding into national innovation rates, this temptation is understandable. Why not control for, say, those factors identified by Furman, Porter, & Stern (2002) as contributing to national innovative capacity? 57 The answer is that this the decentralization hypothesis holds that such policies are either endogenous to government structure, or are overwhelmed by its causal effects. Although this may sound like an extreme interpretation of the decentralization argument, recall that these mid-level institutions and policies are exactly those which NSI scholars have failed to generalize as causal explanations after almost two decades of research.
Take as an example the recent debate about the promotion of "intelligent design" in the United States. A decentralization theorist would argue that, if the US had a centralized government structure, then the Bush administration or a Republican controlled congress could have required US public schools to teach intelligent design as science, and even deemphasized the teaching of evolution. Depending on the extremes to which this policy were taken, private schools might also have felt a need to join this movement in order to be "competitive", or to meet government certification requirements. However, since the US is decentralized, the decision over intelligent design was left up to the states and the local school boards. Most of these school districts opted to omit intelligent design, others chose to place warning stickers on biology textbooks, still others actively promoted the teaching of intelligent design as science. The courts then got involved to thwart the teaching of intelligent design as science in some states, while voters changed outcomes in local elections in others. Thus decentralized government, both horizontal and vertical, has arguably played an important role in virtually eliminating intelligent design, and continuing the support for teaching evolution, in science classrooms. A very different outcome might have occurred in a centralized American democracy.
Decentralization proponents argue that similar types of policy battles are regularly fought over R&D spending, science policy, education budgets, high-technology procurement, teaching & testing standards, etc. These fights take place between different interest groups at both the federal and local levels, as well as between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Hence, all sorts of policies important for innovation are arguably endogenous to government structure, and in very much the ways described by decentralization scholars (i.e. policy responds to competition between different branches and levels of government; is made better by superior information available to voters and policymakers at the local level; decentralization creates a menu of different policy environments for consumers of public goods to choose from, etc). Note that we need not necessarily nor disagree with this; rather the purpose of this paper is merely to test the decentralizationinnovation thesis as given.
Nonetheless, for those who are not fully convinced by the endogeneity argument, in some regressions I do experiment with four additional controls. Three of these are variables which are specifically cited by innovation and some decentralization scholars as important causal factors for innovation, and which are arguably not endogenous to government structure. First, openness to trade (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP) is generally considered to provide competitive motivation for long-run innovation. 58 Second, military spending is too considered by many to be a major source of technological progress, and is included in the regressions as a percentage of gross national product. 59 Third, natural resources are considered an obstacle to innovation, "cursing" otherwise innovative countries into a cycle of dependence on exports of oil, metals, raw materials, and agricultural products. 60 I therefore experiment with three alternate measures of natural resource base (as a percent of total, alternately: arable land, fuel exports, or metal/ore exports) in my regressions. 61 Finally, although the importance of aggregate education is overstated according to some proponents of the decentralization hypothesis, 62 and arguably endogenous to government structure, I experiment with its inclusion in the regressions. I alternately included controls for undergraduates in science and engineering (total and per capita), literacy (as percent of population), and government expenditure on education (as percent of total and percent of GNP). 63 
Primary Regression Results
The first and most important finding of the regressions is that government decentralization is consistently insignificant. With but a single exception, no regression yielded a significant coefficient for any measure of decentralization used in any combination with any of the innovation measures or conditional variables. This result occurred regardless of the time period tested, the measure of decentralization used, the conditional variables included, and whether patents, publications, or high-technology exports were employed as the regressand. Representative results of the main set of regressions are tabulated in Tables 1-2 .
[*** TABLES 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE ***] The lone case in which the null hypothesis can be rejected occurs when I sub-divide countries by wealth, but here the affect is fairly small (Table 3) . In this case, regression analysis suggests that decentralization may foster innovation, but only for one measure of decentralization, and only when the dataset is constrained to a small subset of wealthy countries. Here a 0.1 increase in the POLCON scale is associated with a 33.6 percent increase in patent citations, 12.8 percent rise in publication citations (for OECD members), and a 0.003 percentage point rise in high-technology exports per GDP (for high GDP-per-capita countries). Note however that the mean POLCON score for either sub-group of wealthy countries is around 0.7, with a maximum of 0.88 and a standard deviation of ~0.25. Hence the effect of POLCON on innovation, while statistically significant, is not very large. And interestingly, neither centralization nor decentralization appeared to affect the pace of technological change in non-wealthy countries, by any measure. These results are discussed further below.
The coefficients of the other independent variables should be interpreted with caution. Since the regressions presented here were designed specifically to test the relationship between decentralization and innovation, firm conclusions cannot be drawn from them about the other independent variables. I therefore prefer to treat them as hypotheses in need of further direct testing.
One of these tentative findings is that trade matters. Trade as a percentage of GDP is significant and positive in most regressions that include it as an independent variable, and across each measure of innovation. The coefficients suggest that, cross-nationally, a 10 percent increase in trade as a percentage of GDP is associated with a 10-20 percent increase in citations-weighted patents per capita, a 7-8 percent increase in citations-weighted publications per capita, and a 0.005-0.01 percentage point increase in high-technology exports as a percent of GDP. The relatively larger effect of trade on patenting could reflect a greater concern for intellectual property protection by trading nations. Also the seemingly small effect of trade openness on high-tech exports is not quite so minor when we realize that the sample mean for high-tech exports per GDP is only 0.023 percent (with a standard deviation = 0.056 percent). Overall, this finding that trade-openness fosters innovation dovetails with much of the trade-innovation literature, and I view it as an additional piece of confirmatory evidence to that debate. 64 A second tentative finding is that level of development matters for innovation. The per capita development measure carried high levels of significance and large coefficients in every patents or publications regression which included it as an independent variable. In simple bivariate regressions with either patents or publications as the dependent variable, logged KwH per capita accounted for over 72 percent of the variance (though this dropped to 10 percent when hightechnology exports was used as the measure of innovation). This makes level of development a likely suspect as a primary source of the high R 2 's in the multiple regressions of patents and publications. 65 Of course, high multicollinearity amongst the regressors might also be to blame. In order to test this, the variance inflation factors (VIF's) were calculated and the highest individual VIF is reported for each regression with an R 2 of 0.75 or above. 66 The low VIF's suggest that high multicollinearity is not a problem. Substitution of GDP per capita as the development measure yielded no significant differences in the results reported. Nor do these coefficients change significantly across different regression models. Where high-technology exports are concerned, level of development does not seem to be significant. This could reflect both the rise of less developed innovators such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Ireland, as well as the out-sourcing of hightechnology manufacturing by Western firms to Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. Hence you do appear to need to be developed in order to patent and publish, but not necessarily to make your economy a hub for high-technology exports.
Likewise GDP carried high levels of significance in many of the regressions which included it as an independent variable. However, these coefficients were at best only half as large as those for economic development. This implies that a percentage change in the size of the economy has only half the effect on innovation of a percentage change in economic development.
There are a few other results worth noting. Interestingly, democracy is significant only for a minority of the regressions, a subset of those involving patents or publications. And the coefficients for democracy are very small, implying a mere 3-13 percent increase in patents or publications for a undergraduates, literacy, and education spending also failed to substantively affect the coefficients or significance levels for decentralization. These regressions suggested that, even when we control for education, government structure has little overall effect on national innovation rates.
Finally, various lagged measures of the dependent variable (citations-weighted patents citations, simple & per capita) were experimented with in each of the regressions, but with little change in the results except to drive up the variance inflation factors to more worrisome levels. And since a high correlation (r = 0.87) exists between lagged innovation and electric power consumption, it was felt that the latter measure sufficiently captured the control one would seek in the former. This also allows me to avoid many of the methodological and interpretational problems surrounding lagged dependent variables. 67 
Secondary Regression Results
One possible explanation for the null results reported for government structure is that decentralization may take time to have its effect on technological innovation. After all, in order for government structure to affect the conditions and incentives for innovation, it must first alter the political, economic, and policy environments within which innovators operate. This might take several election or business cycles to be realized in full. In order to test this possibility, I used the 1974 values for my independent variables and regressed the later five-year sub-periods of innovation on them (1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-85) . These regression results closely resemble those for the entire time period, though interestingly with generally larger coefficients for GDP and (for patents) smaller coefficients for level of development. Hence economic size seems to affect innovation more strongly over longer time-periods, development less so. Also, military spending in these regressions appears significant for both patenting and publishing across all models tested, while arable land appears significant in many models. But each of these findings is peripheral to my main concern with decentralization. The fact remains that, even after a decade or two, government structure is still insignificant for innovation rates regardless of the model tested.
This dovetails with what we saw in Figures Admittedly, this test only covers a 15-20 year time lag, therefore I must remain agnostic as to the effects of decentralization over longer periods of time.
A second alternate explanation for the results reported above is that government decentralization might have a bell-shaped relationship with innovation. That is, there may be diminishing returns to decentralization such that highly decentralized or highly centralized governments may hinder innovation, but that a happy medium exists. I therefore conducted tests using a "bell" constructed on the POLCON index, but they too failed to produce significant results.
A third possible explanation for the null results above is that decentralization might benefit innovation in the advanced economies, while centralization might help lesser developed countries in Gerschenkronian fashion. 68 That is, with their luxury of having the advanced economies as models, backward economies may benefit more from a powerful central authority that can force actors down a well-trodden economic path towards technological development. Conversely, this kind of centralized power might be a handicap for the advanced economies, which by nature of their position at the economic frontier must find their way forward more by experiment than by government direction. I experiment with two tests for this hypothesis, and the results merit further study. First I split the data into OECD and non-OECD subgroups and re-ran the regressions above.
Second I repeated this exercise, instead splitting the data into "wealthy" and "non-wealthy" subgroups, where "wealthy" is defined as being in the top 10 percent of GDP per capita. 69 In both instances, the POLCON measure showed small but positive and significant coefficients, but not any of the other decentralization measures. It is possible that this result is due to selection bias based on the small and overlapping samples. Alternately, it may suggest that not only does decentralization matter for wealthy countries, but that informal decentralization (which only the POLCON measure captures) may be more important than structural decentralization. In other words, structural decentralization does not matter if all actors in the structure belong to the same political party and have similar political-economic preferences. (extent of party alignment across branches of government and the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch).
[*** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ***]
Potential Problems
The regressions reported here do have drawbacks which somewhat restrict, but by no means eliminate, their usefulness as tests of the government structure-innovation relationship. First, a need to conserve degrees of freedom prevents me from adding country and year fixed effects. The concern over country fixed affects is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that other researchers have used pure fixed-effects models in regressions on patent data, and produced results which show no significant innovative differences between decentralized and centralized states. 70 Likewise, the separation of the dataset into temporal subperiods should mitigate some of the concerns over year fixed effects.
It is tempting to imagine that endogeneity may be at play. However there currently exists neither theoretical justification nor empirical evidence to suspect that an uncontrolled variable affects both government structure and innovation. Nor is there reason to suspect that somehow technological change affects government structure. History shows us both democratic and totalitarian states that have taken advantage of technological change to strengthen the power of central government, as well states which have used it to devolve power out to the subnational level.
Also, these regressions may resemble data-mining or seem cavalier. They are not. The inclusion of the different control variables above (trade, military spending, etc) both have solid theoretical basis and were prompted by the specific recommendations of innovation scholars.
However, so much the better if the regressions had been data-mining or cavalier. Data-mining is indeed problematic when it finds correlations that are then used to prove a theory; but if one goes to the extreme of data-mining and still cannot find a correlation between two variables, then the likelihood that a relationship exists between them becomes highly suspect, which is what I argue here. Likewise, if I had found a statistically significant relationship between decentralization and innovation, then questions about whether the regressions were overly casual and cavalier would have been an issue. But here it would only further support the argument against decentralization hypothesis. Indeed, it seems that no matter how cavalier one gets with the data, one still cannot find a relationship between decentralized government and innovation. The non-correlation is quite robust.
Another possibility is there may be changing returns to decentralization over time. The
Spanish case and the subdivision into of time periods would seem to rule out this possibility.
However, to be fair, one could theorize a situation whereby decentralization might result in few gains in innovation as the country initially moves to a new political-economic equilibrium, followed by a rapid increase in innovation as the new structural incentives take hold, and then diminishing returns after the new equilibrium solidifies. In other words, although the assumption of a simple linear relationship between government structure and innovation can now be seriously called into question, this does not eliminate the possibility of a more complex model, or the need to consider far longer time periods than are analyzed above.
While these issues reveal the limitations of statistical analysis in testing the government structure-innovation relationship, they do not invalidate the results reported here. Certainly, the results produced above are robust enough to allow us to question the innovative advantages of government decentralization, especially the stronger versions of the decentralization hypothesis.
They also point to the importance of case studies as the next step in research on this question. Case studies are important for confirming the statistical results produced here. They can resolve, at close range, whether there are truly no significant lines of causality between government structure and innovation, or whether wealth and government structure might interact to affect the policy environment for innovators; whether broad structural forces exist but are obscured or overwhelmed by other factors, or are conditional on some omitted variable. Case studies would also allow us to go beyond patent data, and judge with greater scrutiny the pace and degree of innovation being performed.
Conclusions and Implications
In sum, I have examined two separate sets of patent evidence, along with data on scientific publications and high-technology exports, and found that decentralized states are generally no more technologically innovative than centralized states. These findings were robust to the inclusion of several conditional variables, including controls for democracy, development, size, natural resources, military spending, trade openness, and even education. The only exception to this finding was a minor effect, which appeared only amongst a small subset of wealthy countries and only when using the broadest measure of decentralization.
The conventional wisdom is therefore incorrect. Political decentralization may have other benefits, but it appears to be neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or predicting national innovation rates. Certainly no single statistical test or dataset is by itself conclusive, but the compounding of the several alternate measures and methods used above establishes a firm basis for questioning the assumption that government decentralization leads to higher innovation rates. And if we believe that what matters most for long-run aggregate technological change is a competitive environment, then the implication of these findings for policymaking is that government decentralization is but one way to achieve this, if at all.
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Perhaps more provocative were the secondary findings, such as the relatively minor influence of democracy, and relatively large effect of lagged military spending, on innovation over time. These results deserve some attention in future research since they contradict much of the endogenous-growth literature which puts a heavy emphasis on civilian democratic institutions for explaining long-run innovation-driven economic growth and efficiency. It suggests that, rather than being a natural product of institutional reform, innovation could instead be a rational solution to a perceived security problem. In other words, long-run technological innovation may find better explanations in international relations theory rather than comparative political institutions. This is an aspect almost totally ignored by the economists and sociologists who study innovation, and deserves greater attention from political scientists. Of course it is important not to get ahead of ourselves here, since the various tests reported here were not specifically designed to examine causal relationships between democracy and innovation. A useful next step in testing, therefore, would be for researchers to conduct in-depth qualitative analysis of individual technological case studies in order to confirm and refine each of the findings above. Note: Analysis is by ordinary least squares (OLS), Huber-White estimates of standard errors reported in brackets. All independent variables are 1974 values, all dependent variables are overall value of the 1990-95 period. † p<.10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p<.001, ‡ omitted due to high multicollinearity.
